Mental Disability and the Death Penalty by Michael L. Perlin

Author:Michael L. Perlin [Perlin, Michael L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Rowman and Littlefield
Published: 2013-12-21T05:00:00+00:00

Bonnie, supra note 56, at 177 (footnotes omitted).

60. O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1339 (2007). See also, John F. Edens et al., Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder Trials: Is It Time to “Disinvent the Wheel?” 29 Law & Human Behav. 55, 81 (2005) (on how poor expert testimony is obscured by the “guise of science”).

61. Cunningham et al., supra note 57, at 226.

62. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 6–16.

63. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898. Cf. Comment, Crystal-Balling Death, 30 Baylor L. Rev. 35, 54 (1978) (pointing out that Jurek “did not deal at all with the specific problem of psychiatric judgments which purport to predict future dangerousness”). See e.g., Lyle G. v. Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center, 521 N.Y.S.2d 94 (A.D. 1987) (rejecting, on the basis of Barefoot, challenges to psychiatric expertise to predict dangerousness) (non–death penalty case).

64. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).

65. Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 822, 829 n. 35 (1967).

66. Barefoot’s Ake, supra note 41, at 111 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). On the question of the need for extra reliability in capital punishment decision making, see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, J.). See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), discussed extensively infra chapter 6.

67. On the meager follow-up litigation on this aspect of Barefoot, see infra notes 68–70.

See, however, State v. Davis, 477 A.2d 308 (N.J. 1984), sanctioning the admissibility of statistical evidence by a defendant at the penalty phase of a capital case relating to empirical studies pertaining to the defendant’s rehabilitory potential in a case where the defendant raised his character as a mitigating factor (id. at 310–12; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (1982)), relying on Justice Blackmun’s dissent to buttress its position, 477 A.2d at 311, and discussed extensively in Barefoot’s Ake, supra note 41, at 119–21; State v. Daniels, 446 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135 (1995) (expert testimony in capital case could be based on review of records of other doctors and discussions with the defendant’s friends and family, even if expert conducted no in-person tests or evaluations of defendant), discussed in John Christopher Johnson, State v. Daniels: Chief Justice Exum’s Quantum Theory of Psychiatric Testimony, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 2326 (1995).

68. But see Davis, 477 A. 2d at 312, 314. Cf. Deveau v. United States, 483 A.2d 307, 315–16 (D.C. App. 1984) (quoting Justice Blackmun’s dissent on unreliability of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness), and id. at 316 (“If the trial court has reason to reject the opinions of the experts on the issue of dangerousness, it may also do so even though they are unanimous”).

69. Streetman v. State, 698 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)Streetman v. State, 698 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 708–9 (Tex.

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